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Abstract
Given empirical evidence for the dependence of an outcome variable on an exposure
variable, we can typically only provide bounds for the “probability of causation” in the case
of an individual who has developed the outcome after being exposed. We show how these
bounds can be adapted or improved if further information becomes available. In addition
to reviewing existing work on this topic, we provide a new analysis for the case where a
mediating variable can be observed. In particular we show how the probability of causation
can be bounded when there is no direct effect and no confounding.
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1 Introduction
Many statistical analyses aim at a causal explanation of the data. In particular in epidemiol-
ogy many studies are conducted to try to understand if and when an exposure will cause a
particular disease. Also in a Court of Law, when we want to assess legal responsibility we
usually refer to causality. But when discussing this topic it is important to specify the exact
query we want to talk about. For example it may be claimed in court that it was Ann’s taking
the drug that was the cause of her death. This type of question relates to the cause of an
observed effect (“CoE”) and is fundamental to the allocation of responsibility. On the other
hand much of classical statistical design and analysis, for example randomized agricultural
or medical experiments, has been created to address questions about the effects of applied
causes (“EoC”). When we address an EoC query, we are typically asking a hypothetical
question: “What would happen to Ann if she were to take the drug?”. At the very same time
we can address alternative hypothetical questions: “What would happen to Ann if she were
not to take the drug?”.
Assessing the effects of causes can be achieved in straightforward fashion using a frame-
work based on probabilistic prediction and statistical decision theory [2]. To formalize the
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Die Live Total
Exposed 30 70 100
Unexposed 12 88 100
Table 1: Deaths in individuals exposed and unexposed to the same drug taken by Ann
problem, let X be a binary decision variable denoting whether or not Ann takes the drug, and
Y the response, coded as 1 if she dies and 0 if not. We denote by P1 [resp. P0] the probability
distribution of Y ensuing when X is set to the value 1 [resp. 0]. The two distributions P1
and P0 are all that is needed to address EoC-type queries: I can compare these two different
hypothetical distributions for Y , decide which one I prefer, and take the associated decision.
The situation is different for a CoE query, where the drug has already been taken and the
outcome observed. A natural way to address a CoE question would be to try to imagine what
would have happened to Ann had she not been taken the drug. In other words, given the fact
that Ann actually took the drug and died, how likely is it that she would not have died if she
had not taken the drug? We can not address a CoE query using only the two distribution P1
and P0. In fact we can no longer base our approach purely on the probability distribution of Y
and X conditioned on known facts, since we know the values of both variables (Y = 1, X = 1),
and after conditioning on that knowledge there is no probabilistic uncertainty left to work
with. Nevertheless we want an answer. This query can be approached by introducing (for any
individual) an associated pair of “potential responses” Y := (Y (0),Y (1)), where Y (x) denotes
the value of the response Y that will be realized when the exposure X is set to x (which we
write as X ← x). Both potential responses are regarded as existing, simultaneously, prior to
the choice of X , the actual response Y then being determined as Y = Y (X). However, for
any each individual just one of the potential responses will be observable. For example, only
Y (1) will be observable if in fact X ← 1; Y (0) will then be counterfactual, because it relates
to a situation, X ← 0, which is contrary to the known fact X ← 1.
To address the court’s query we use the formulation of Probability of Causation, PC,
as given by Pearl in [5] (where it is named Probability of Necessity). In terms of the triple
(XA,YA(0),YA(1)), we define the Probability of Causation in Ann’s case as:
PCA = PA(YA(0) = 0 | XA = 1,YA(1) = 1) (1)
where PA denotes the probability distribution over attributes of Ann. Knowing that Ann did
take the drug (XA = 1) and the actual response was recovery (YA = 1), this is the probability
that the potential response YA(0), that would been observed had Ann not taken the drug,
would have been different (YA(0) = 0). But how are we to get a purchase on this quantity?
Suppose that a good experimental study tested the same drug taken by Ann, and produced
the data reported in Table 1. Since our analysis here is not concerned with purely statistical
variation due to small sample sizes, we take proportions computed from this table as accurate
estimates of the corresponding population probabilities (see [3] for issues related to the use
of small-sample data for making causal inferences). Thus we take
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1) = 0.30
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0) = 0.12
where we use Pr to denote population probabilities.
2
We see that, in the experimental population, individuals exposed to the drug (X ← 1)
were more likely to die than those unexposed (X ← 0), by 28 percentage points. So can
the court infer that was Ann’s taking the drug that caused her death? More generally: Is it
correct to use such experimental results, concerning a population, to say something about a
single individual? This “Group-to-individual” (G2i) issue is discussed by Dawid et al. [6]
in relation to the question “When can Science be relied upon to answer factual disputes in
litigation?”. It is there pointed out that in general we can not obtain a point estimate for PCA;
but we can provide useful information, in the form of bounds between which this quantity
must lie.
In this paper we show how these bounds can be adapted or improved when further infor-
mation is available. In §2 we consider the basic situation where we have information only on
exposure and outcome. In §3 we bound the probability of causation when we have additional
information on a pre-treatment covariate. Section 4 considers the situation in which unob-
served variables confound the exposure-outcome relationship. Finally in §5 we introduce
new bounds for PC when a mediating variable can be observed. Section 6 presents some
concluding comments.
2 Starting Point: Simple Analysis
In this section we discuss the simple situation in which we have information, as in Table 1,
from a randomized experimental study. We need to assume that the fact of Ann’s exposure,
XA, is independent of her potential responses YA:
XA⊥⊥YA. (2)
Property (2) parallels the “no-confounding” property Xi⊥⊥Yi which holds for individuals
i in the experimental study on account of randomization. We further suppose that Ann is
exchangeable with the individuals in the experiment, i.e. she could be considered as a subject
in the experimental population.
On account of (2) and exchangeability, (1) reduces to PCA = Pr(Y (0) = 0 | Y (1) = 1);
but we can not fully identify this from the data. In fact we can never observe the joint event
(Y (0) = 0;Y (1) = 1), since at least one of Y (0),Y (1) must be counterfactual. In particu-
lar, we can never learn anything about the dependence between Y (0) and Y (1). However,
even without making any assumptions about this dependence, we can derive the following
inequalities [3]:
1− 1
RR
≤ PCA ≤
Pr(Y = 0 | X ← 0)
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
(3)
where
RR =
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0)
is the experimental risk ratio between exposed and unexposed. And these bounds can be
estimated from the experimental data using the population death rates computed in §1.
In many cases of interest (such as Table 1), we will have
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0)< Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)< Pr(Y = 0 | X ← 0).
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Then the lower bound in (3) will be non-trivial, while the upper bound will exceed 1, and
hence be vacuous.
We see from (3) that whenever RR > 2 the Probability of Causation PCA will exceed
50%. In a civil court this is often taken as the criterion to assess legal responsibility “on
the balance of probabilities” (although the converse is false: it would not be correct to infer
PCA < .5 from the finding RR < 2). Since, in Table 1, the exposed are 2.5 times as likely to
die as the unexposed (RR = 30/12 = 2.5), we have enough confidence to infer causality in
Ann’s case: We have 0.60≤ PCA ≤ 1.
3 Additional Covariate Information
In this Section we show how we can refine the bounds of (3) if further information about a
pre-treatment covariate S is available. We now take the assumptions of §2 to hold after con-
ditioning on S (indeed in cases where the original assumptions fail, it may well be possible
to reinstate them by conditioning on a suitable covariate S). In particular, XA⊥⊥YA | SA, and
Xi⊥⊥Yi | Si: adjusting for S is enough to control for confounding, both for Ann and in the
study.
3.1 Fully observable
Consider first the situation where we can observe S both in the experimental data and in
Ann. We can apply the analysis of §2, after conditioning on S, to obtain the estimable lower
bound:
1−
1
RR(sA)
≤ PCA (4)
where
RR(s) =
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1,S = s)
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0,S = s)
,
and sA is Ann’s value for S.
3.2 Observable in data only
But even when we can only observe S in the population, and not in Ann, we can sometimes
refine the bounds in (3). Thus suppose S is binary, and from the data we infer the following
probabilities (which are consistent with the data of Table 1):
PA(S = 1) = 0.50 (5)
PA(Y = 1 | X ← 1,S = 1) = 0.60 (6)
PA(Y = 1 | X ← 0,S = 1) = 0 (7)
PA(Y = 1 | X ← 1,S = 0) = 0 (8)
PA(Y = 1 | X ← 0,S = 0) = 0.24 (9)
Since we know XA = 1,YA = 1, from (8) we deduce SA = 1, and so YA(0) = 0 by (7).
That is, in this special case we can infer causation in Ann’s case—even though we have not
directly observed her value for S.
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Die Live Total
Exposed 18 82 100
Unexposed 24 76 100
Table 2: Non experimental data
More generally (see [1]) we can refine the bounds in (3) as follows:
∆
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
≤ PC≤ 1− Γ
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
(10)
where
∆ = ∑
s
Pr(S = s)×max{0,Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1,S = s)−Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0,S = s)}
Γ = ∑
s
Pr(S = s)×max{0,Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1,S = s)−Pr(Y = 0 | X ← 0,S = s)}
These bounds are never wider than those obtained from (3), whicn ignores S.
4 Unobserved Confounding
So far we have assumed no confounding: X⊥⊥Y (perhaps conditionally on a stuitable co-
variate S), both for Ann and for the study data. Now we drop this assumption for Ann. Then
the experimental data can not be used, by themselves, to learn about PCA = P(YA(0) = 0 |
XA = 1,YA(1) = 1).
We might however be able to gather additional observational data, having the same de-
pendence between X and Y as for Ann. Let Q denote the joint observational distribution of
(X ,Y ), estimable from such data. Tian and Pearl [4] obtain the following bounds for PCA,
given both experimental and nonexperimental data:
max
{
0, Q(Y = 1)−Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0)Q(X = 1,Y = 1)
}
≤ PCA≤min
{
1, Pr(Y = 0 | X ← 0)−Q(X = 0,Y = 0)Q(X = 1,Y = 1)
}
.
(11)
For example, suppose that, in addition to the data of Table 1, we have observational data
as in Table 2.
Thus
Q(Y = 1) = 0.21
Q(X = 1,Y = 1) = 0.09
Q(X = 0,Y = 0) = 0.38.
Also, from Table 1 we have Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0) = 0.12 (so Pr(Y = 0 | X ← 0) = 1−0.12 =
0.88). From (11) we thus find 1 ≤ PCA ≤ 1. We deduce that Ann would definitely have
survived had she not taken the drug.
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X M Y
Figure 1: Directed Acyclic Graph representing a mediator M, responding to exposure X and
affecting response Y . There is no “direct effect”, unmediated by M, of X on Y .
5 Mediation Analysis
In this Section we bound the Probability of Causation for a case where a third variable, M, is
involved in the causal pathway between the exposure X and the outcome Y . Such a variable
is called a mediator. In general, the total causal effect of X on Y can be split into two different
effects: One mediated by M (the indirect effect) and one not so mediated (the direct effect).
Here we shall only consider the case of no direct effect, as intuitively described by Figure 1.
We shall be interested in the case that M is observable in the experimental data, but is not
observed for Ann, and see how this additional experimental evidence can be used to refine
the bounds on PCA.
To formalize our assumption of “no direct effect”, we introduce M(x), the potential value
of M for X ← x, and Y (m), the potential value of Y for M← m and X ← x, where x is any
value—the irrelevance of that value representing the property that X has no effect on Y over
and above that transmitted through its influence on the mediator M. The potential value of
Y for X ← x (in cases where there is no intervention on M, which we here assume) is then
Y ∗(x) := Y{M(x)}.
In the sequel we restrict to the case that all variables are binary, and define M :=(M(0),M(1)),
Y :=(Y (0),Y (1)), Y∗ :=(Y ∗(0),Y ∗(1)). In particular, we have observable variables (X ,M,Y )=
(X ,M(X),Y ∗(X)). We denote the bivariate distributions of the potential response pairs by
mab := Pr(M(0) = a,M(1) = b)
yrs := Pr(Y (0) = r,Y (1) = s)
y∗rs := Pr(Y ∗(0) = r,Y ∗(1) = s).
Then
ma+ = Pr(M = a | X ← 0)
m+b = Pr(M = b | X ← 1)
yr+ = Pr(Y = r |M← 0)
y+s = Pr(Y = s |M← 1)
y∗r+ = Pr(Y = r | X ← 0)
y∗+s = Pr(Y = s | X ← 1)
where yr+ denote ∑1s=0 yrs, etc.
In addition to the assumptions of §2 we further suppose that none of the causal mecha-
nisms depicted in Figure 1 are confounded—expressed mathematically by assuming mutual
independence between X , M and Y (both for experimental individuals, and for Ann). Then
ma+, m+b, yr+, y+s, y∗r+, y∗+s are all estimable from experimental data in which X is random-
ized, and M and Y are observed.
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It is also then easy to show the Markov property:
Y ⊥⊥X |M.
This observable property can serve as a test of the validity of our conditions. It implies
y∗00 = m00y0++(m01 +m10)y00 +m11y+0 (12)
y∗01 = m01y01 +m10y10 (13)
y∗10 = m01y10 +m10y01 (14)
y∗11 = m00y1++(m01 +m10)y11 +m11y+1, (15)
and
y∗r+ = m0+yr++m1+y+r (16)
y∗+s = m+0ys++m+1y+s (17)
Suppose now that we observe XA = 1, YA = 1, but do not observe MA. We have
PCA =
y∗01
y∗+1
=
m01y01 +m10y10
y∗+1
. (18)
The denominator of (18) is Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1), which is estimable from the data.
As for the numerator, this can be expressed as
2µη +Aµ +Bη +AB = 2(µ +B/2)(η +A/2)+AB/2 (19)
with µ = m01, η = y01, A = y+0− y0+, B = m+0−m0+. Note that A, B are identified from
the data, while for µ and η we can only obtain inequalities:
max{0,−B} ≤ µ ≤ min{m0+,m+1}
max{0,−A} ≤ η ≤ min{y0+,y+1},
so that
|B/2| ≤ µ +B/2 ≤ min{12(m0++m+0),
1
2 (m1++m+1)}
|A/2| ≤ η +A/2 ≤ min{12(y0++ y+0),
1
2(y1++ y+1)}.
(20)
The lower [resp., upper] limit for (19) will be when µ +B/2 and η +A/2 are both at their
lower [resp., upper] limits. In particular, the lower limit for (19) is max{0,AB}. Using (16)
and (17), we compute AB = y∗+1− y∗1+, which leads to the lower bound
PCA ≥ 1−
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
Pr(Y = 1 | X ← 0)
= 1− 1
RR
, (21)
exactly as for the case that M was not observed. Thus the possibility to observe a mediating
variable in the experimental data has not improved our ability to lower bound PCA.
We do however obtain an improved upper bound. Taking into account the various possi-
ble choices for the upper bounds in (20), the uper bound for the numerator of (18), in terms
of experimentally estimable quantities, is given in Table 3.
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m1++m+1 ≥ 1 m1++m+1 < 1
y1++ y+1 ≥ 1 m0+y0++m+0y+0 m1+y+0 +m+1y0+
y1++ y+1 < 1 m0+y+1 +m+0y1+ m1+y1++m+1y+1
Table 3: Upper bound for numerator of (18)
5.1 Example
Suppose we obtain the following values from the data:
Pr(M = 1 | X ← 1) = 0.25
Pr(M = 1 | X ← 0) = 0.025
Pr(Y = 1 |M← 1) = 0.9
Pr(Y = 1 |M← 0) = 0.1
(these are consistent with Table 1).
Then we find 0.60 ≤ PCA ≤ 0.76; whereas without taking account of the mediator we
would have no non-trivial upper bound.
6 Discussion
In this paper we have considered estimation of the Probability of Causation in a number of
contexts, including a novel analysis for the case of a mediating variable, in the absence of
a direct effect. As we saw in §5 considering such a third variable in the pathway between
exposure and outcome can lead to an improved upper bound, although conclusions about the
lower bound remains the same.
Even if the case of no direct effect is special and unusual, there certainly do exist cases,
such as the relationship between anxiolytics and cars crash mediated by alcohol consump-
tion, or the relationship between aspirin and yellow jaundice due to hemolytic anemia me-
diated by favism, where this assumption is plausible. The next step will be generalize our
analysis to more general cases of mediation, allowing for a direct effect and for unobserved
confounding.
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